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1. Introduction 
Theories of direct reference maintain that names 
contribute their bearers to propositions expressed by 
sentences or utterances on occasions of use. On these 
theories, names contribute only their bearers and have no 
surplus meaning. The sentence “Wittgenstein taught 
school in Kirchberg” expresses the proposition identified by 
the ordered pair <Wittgenstein, having taught school in 
Kirchberg>. Whether theories of direct reference are 
correct is a matter of dispute. Kripke’s (1972) arguments 
against descriptive theories of the meanings of names 
were persuasive, but descriptive theorists have 
persuasively fought back (Stanley, 1997). In this paper, I 
will not attempt to settle the larger dispute between the two 
opposing camps, but will focus on the matter of what a 
direct reference theorist ought to say about names that 
lack bearers. In order even to be a contender in the larger 
dispute between referentialists and descriptivists, theories 
of direct reference must have a plausible story to tell about 
the use of names that name nothing in utterances and 
sentences both positive and negative.  
Positive uses of empty names include “Santa 
Claus lives at the North Pole.” What proposition is 
expressed by this sentence? Does the sentence express a 
truth or a falsehood? Negative uses of empty names 
include “Santa Claus does not exist.” What proposition is 
expressed by this sentence? Is this sentence true or false? 
Until direct reference theorists have a plausible account of 
such sentences and the role of names in them, direct 
reference theories are not even in the game (so to speak). 
In what follows, I will sketch an account of the role 
of names that lack bearers and of their contribution to what 
is expressed on both their positive and negative use. I will 
offer a theory that is consistent with theories of direct 
reference and a theory that claims that names make the 
same contribution on an occasion of use regardless of 
whether they actually name something or not. I then will 
defend the view from recent criticisms. 
 
2. The View 
On the view that I like (Adams & Stecker, 1994), 
names that name nothing mean nothing and say nothing. 
Lacking referents, their use in sentences or utterances, 
convey no bearer into the propositional structure that may 
be expressed. This is true whether employed in positive or 
negative sentences. So “a is F” expresses < __, being F>, 
and “a is not F” expresses <___, not being F> when “a” 
names nothing. There are good reasons (Braun, 1993) to 
think that propositional structures are expressed by such 
sentences or utterances, and there are equally good 
reasons to think that neither sentential form expresses a 
truth (Adams & Stecker, 1994). This becomes particularly 
troubling for sentences such as “Santa Claus does not 
exist” or “Vulcan does not exist” because these negative 
existential sentences surely seem to be true. Yet, if the 
above account is correct, they express something of the 
form <__, non-existence> (or better, there is not an x such 
that x = ___, where one cannot fill the blank). Thus, on the 
above account, negative existential sentences employing 
empty names do not express truths (or falsehoods). This 
plainly seems wrong, (at least at first). 
To make the view more palatable, it must explain 
away the intuition that negative existential sentences 
employing empty names express truths. It does so by 
finding something true that, although not literally 
semantically expressed by such sentences, is 
pragmatically imparted. It does this by appealing to two 
mechanisms: association and pragmatic implication. When 
we hear new names we cognitively place them into a 
mental file or dossier (Recanati, 1993). We associate 
descriptions with those names, but the descriptions do not 
give the meanings of the names (as they are contingently 
associated with the names through a process of mental 
association—just as the empiricist, associationist 
philosophers and psychologists have long maintained). If 
we acquire the name “Ludwig Wittgenstein” we may 
associate the descriptions “author of the Tractatus” or 
“famous student of Lord Russell.” These descriptions help 
us cognitively track the individual named. When we say 
“Wittgenstein was a philosopher” we may impart or imply 
that a famous student of Lord Russell was a philosopher, 
but this is not literally expressed by our utterance (what is 
literally expressed is <Wittgenstein, being a philosopher>). 
Still it is information that is there to be conveyed and would 
be conveyed in a community of speakers who typically 
share the same cognitive associations of descriptions and 
names. The mechanism of pragmatic conveyance is 
Gricean (Grice, 1989) and is well known. Hence, we will 
help ourselves to the distinction between what a sentence 
literally semantically expresses and what its utterance can 
pragmatically convey. 
These associations take place whether names are 
empty or not. When children acquire the name “George 
Washington” they typically acquire the associated 
descriptions “first president of the U.S.”, “man who had 
wooden teeth.” When they acquire “Santa Claus” they 
associate with the name “jolly fat man who lives at the 
North Pole” or “man who brings presents on Christmas 
day.” The negative existential “Santa Claus does not exist” 
expresses no literal truth. Still it pragmatically imparts 
truths: truths such as that there is no jolly fat man who 
lives at the North Pole and wears a red suit or that there is 
no one who brings presents to the world’s children on 
Christmas Day. These things, though not literally 
semantically expressed by the negative existential 
sentence, are true. They include information that may be 
pragmatically conveyed by the utterance of the negative 
existential sentence. It is these truths that we mistake for 
the literal truth of the sentence “Santa Claus does not 
exist” when we take that sentence to be true. If this 
account of the role of names is correct, the sentence itself 
is strictly truth-valueless, despite our intuitions to the 
contrary. The theory explains away contrary intuitions, in 
the ways just indicated (Adams, Stecker & Fuller, 1992), 
and can be extended to fictional names (Adams, Fuller & 
Stecker, 1997). The account is unified, attributing to names 
the same kind of semantic contribution in all contexts 
whether the names are filled or empty. Names contribute 
their bearers on occasions of use (if they have bearers) 
and otherwise make no semantic contribution at all. 
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3. Objections & Replies 
In this section I will elaborate the theory by 
considering some recent objections and replies. The first 
objection is that different sentences using different empty 
names seem to say different things, but on this account 
they would all say the same thing, so the theory must be 
false (Everett, manuscript a). Consider “Santa Claus 
doesn’t exist,” “Father Xmas doesn’t exist,” and “Superman 
doesn’t exist.” The first two may say similar things, but the 
latter does not. However, all three should say that there is 
not an x such that x = ___ (where one cannot fill the 
blank). That is, they should all say the same thing on our 
view. 
The reply is that they all do literally say the same 
incomplete negative existential propositional structure—
one lacking a truth-value, but they do not all say it in the 
same way. They express it using different names. In that, 
the situation is not all that different from “Fa” and “Fb” 
where a = b. They express the same proposition but do so 
using different names. The main difference is that, in cases 
of empty names, no complete propositions are expressed. 
Similarly, with filled names we may associate different 
descriptions. With “Tony Curtis” we associate “famous film 
star and father of Jamie Lee.” With “Bernie Schwartz” we 
may associate “gray-haired gentleman dressed in black.” 
Tony Curtis = Bernie Schwartz. Yet saying “Tony Curtis is 
here” may appear to say something different than “Bernie 
Schwartz is here” because of the different associations (in 
the minds of those not in the know). 
Similarly, we may associate the same descriptions 
with “Santa Claus” and with “Father Xmas,” but not with 
“Superman.” The differences in descriptions are due to 
differences in the lore surrounding the religious and 
holiday figures versus the comic strip hero. But any 
apparent differences of expression are due to the 
differences of associated descriptions and not due to 
difference of literal, semantic content expressed. “Santa 
doesn’t exist” pragmatically imparts, but does not literally 
semantically express that no jolly fat man in a red suit who 
brings presents to the world’s children exists. Perhaps 
“Father Xmas doesn’t exist” pragmatically imparts the 
same thing (if it has the same associations). But 
“Superman doesn’t exist” pragmatically imparts that there 
is no man of steel. It imparts other things because of 
different associated descriptions with “Superman” (though 
these do not give the meaning of the name). That accounts 
for the apparent differences. Therefore, our theory is not 
falsified by these apparent differences. 
Another, more serious objection is that our theory 
cannot explain the modal profile of sentences that contain 
empty names (Everett, manuscript a). The sentence 
“Santa is identical to John Perry” seems not only to 
express a falsity, but a necessary falsity. Yet on our view, it 
expresses the truth valueless propositional structure 
<____ = John Perry> (and it does so using the name 
‘Santa’). If we try to account for the merely apparent falsity 
of the sentence by relying on associated descriptions, we 
may pragmatically impart something such as that the jolly 
fat man in the red suit living at the North Pole who brings 
presents on Christmas day is John Perry. This is not 
literally what the sentence above expresses, but it may be 
pragmatically imparted, as per our account. However, this 
proposition, while false, is at best contingently false. Thus, 
our view cannot explain the apparent necessity, as well as 
apparent falsity of the above type of sentence. 
 In reply, our view can explain both the 
apparent falsity and necessity, but does so in different 
ways. The apparent falsity is already explained nicely 
above. The above sentence pragmatically imparts that 
John Perry is identical with the jolly fat man in the red suit 
living at the North Pole and who brings presents on 
Christmas day. This is false, even though it is only 
pragmatically implied (not literally expressed).  
It is true that it is only contingently false. However, 
this proposition is not what explains the apparent 
necessity. That is explained by our semantical intuitions. 
When we see an expression of the form “a = b,” we know 
that it is either a necessary truth or a necessary falsehood 
(if it expresses a genuine proposition at all). We know this 
because we know (Kripke, 1972) that all identities are 
necessary. “Tony Curtis = Bernie Schwartz” expresses 
something necessary. We know this even before we learn 
that it expresses a truth. “Tony Curtis = John Perry” 
expresses a necessary falsehood, and we know of the 
necessity by the semantic structure of the identity 
sentence even prior to knowing that it is false. 
We know that “Santa” is not a name for John 
Perry.  So it is not like the first identity sentence above. 
This will incline us to think it is like the second. 
Unfortunately, “John Perry = Santa” does not literally 
express a truth or a falsehood, but if it did, it would express 
a necessary falsehood, and we know this via our 
semantical modal intuitions alone. That is how the 
appearance of necessity is explained (away). This is a 
different explanation than that of the appearance of falsity, 
but an explanation nonetheless.  
I will close by considering the view that empty 
names are descriptive names (Kripke, 1972, Evans, 1982). 
Suppose we associate “the inventor of the zip” with the 
name “Julius.” Then suppose there was no single inventor 
of the zip. “Julius does not exist” might be taken to express 
the proposition that there is no inventor of the zip. This 
would be literally true, not merely pragmatically imparted. 
So it may appear to do a better job than our account of 
handling empty names. 
I think this view should be rejected. First, if “Julius” 
names nothing because the description “the inventor of the 
zip” fails to pick something out, then “Julius does not exist” 
still expresses the truth valueless propositional structure 
that there is not an x such that x = __ (where one picked 
out by “inventor of the zip” is to fill the blank). Still there is 
no name to fill the blank, and there is no advantage over 
our view. If one says the proposition expressed is that 
there is no inventor of the zip, then “inventor of the zip” 
would be giving the meaning of “Julius.” Empty names 
would have descriptions as their meaning (contrary to filled 
names). There then would be no uniform contribution that 
names make, whether filled or empty. Second, suppose 
there were a single inventor of the zip, viz., Ken. Then 
“Julius is smart” should express that Julius (aka Ken) is 
smart, but on this alternative view it would express that the 
inventor of the zip is smart (and not act like a name at all). 
Finally, Recanati (1993) maintains that “Julius” is a name 
and once attached to its bearer (aka Ken), we could truly 
assert that Julius didn’t invent the zip. But on the view 
where “inventor of the zip” gives the meaning of “Julius,” 
“Julius does not exist” would express that the inventor of 
the zip didn’t invent the zip. Not good! 
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